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FORGETTING SOMEONE? NEW YORK'S
PERMANENCY LEGISLATION OF 2005
FAILS TO ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN
FOSTER CARE
ROSE L. AMANDOLA1
INTRODUCTION
P.D. first became acquainted with the judicial system when
she was seven months old, after her hospital visit for second-
degree burns heightened the suspicions of authorities.1 That was
just the beginning of her unfortunate journey through the
judicial system. At five years old, the court adjudicated P.D. as
dependent and placed her in the care of an aunt.2 At twelve
years old, P.D. became a foster child.3 After years of languishing
in the system, it seemed that the court's goal of long-term foster
care may have finally been the break that P.D. needed to start
shaping her life in a positive manner. Foster care would, at the
very least, provide her with living arrangements on a continuing
basis.
Yet only six months later, the court abandoned its goal,
abandoning P.D. as well. P.D.'s adjudication as delinquent on a
charge of misdemeanor battery meant the end of her placement
in foster care.4 Not only did the court set aside its previous goals
for P.D., but it also placed her in a shelter with a history of abuse
and neglect accusations.5
The inability of New York Family Courts to adequately
address the needs of foster youth who have committed delinquent
t J.D. Candidate, June 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2002
Binghamton University.
' See Henry & Rilla White Found. v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4Id.
5 Id.
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acts is an all-too-common problem that plagues the judicial
system throughout the country. In New York, in particular, the
statistics are astounding. "Over 50% of youth entering the
detention system have experienced the child welfare system."6
These children number in the thousands.7 The large population
of children who move from foster care to the juvenile justice
system, coupled with the already daunting number of children
who languish in the foster care system has created a scenario
where delinquent youth have essentially fallen to the wayside of
judicial priority." Courts often solve the problem of numerous
delinquents and scarce resources by placing these children in
institutional organizations and juvenile halls, regardless of
whether such placement is particularly appropriate.' The result
is that delinquents once in foster care are uprooted and deprived
of the opportunity to find more permanent living situations.
New York's Permanency Legislation of 200510 (the
"Permanency Bill") seeks to address the needs of children in
foster care generally and to achieve the goal of finding stable,
long-term living arrangements. 1  The law, however, also
represents yet another instance of the overburdened family
court's failure to successfully rise to the challenge that
delinquents in foster care pose. Section 10-A of the Permanency
Bill makes some tremendous strides. Most notably, the law
imposes continuing jurisdiction of the Family Court over children
in foster care, so that a single judge may come to fully
understand a particular child's situation.12 In addition, the
Permanency Bill requires courts to adhere to strict standards. It
necessitates detailed reports outlining major aspects of the
child's life before permanency hearings take place in addition to
6 Molly Armstrong, The Importance of Bridging the Gap Between Child Welfare
and Juvenile Justice for Arrested Foster Youth, in 185 LITIGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN
PROBLEMS 55, 61 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2000).
' See Katharine W. Scrivner, The Dilemma of the Abused Delinquent, 40 FAM.
CT. REV. 135, 136 (2002).
8 See Miriam Aroni Krinsky, A Case for Reform of the Child Welfare System, 45
FAM. CT. REV. 541, 541 (2007).
' See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
10 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1086 (McKinney 2008).
11 The article "is meant to provide children placed out of their homes timely and
effective judicial review that promotes permanency, safety and well-being in their
lives." Id.
12 Id.
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permanency hearings every six months for any child placed out of
the home.13 To say, however, that all children placed outside the
home benefit from the new law's coverage is an exaggeration.
The law excludes juvenile delinquents and persons in need of
supervision ("PINS") from its protection. 14
This Note argues that New York's Permanency Bill, while
representing an improvement in the law, cannot fully and
adequately effectuate its goal of permanency for foster children
while continuing to omit juvenile delinquents from coverage.
Part I of this Note details the applicable laws. It includes a
comparison between New York's Permanency Legislation of 2005
and the permanency hearings of the past, revealing that the
legislature makes some important changes that have the
potential to significantly decrease the number of children aging
out of the child welfare system. Part II of this Note argues that,
despite the many improvements that the Permanency Bill
represents, it does not go far enough in achieving its goal of
permanency for foster children. The statistics alone are enough
to suggest that delinquents-as such a large subgroup of children
in foster care-require inclusion in the new law. 5 Moreover,
there is an alarming connection between children who commit
acts of delinquency and those who were previously abused and/or
neglected. 6 As such, the problems that once led a child to foster
care are often the underlying cause of their delinquency. Finally,
Part III seeks to suggest solutions that would rectify the
weaknesses of the Permanency Bill. As the most obvious first
step, the legislature should amend the new law to include
juvenile delinquents and PINS. In order to optimize the
effectiveness of the law, however, New York should consider a
more extensive solution. The Family Courts has become an
antiquated and ineffective entity. Therefore, the Family Courts
should merge with other lower courts within the state, thus
maximizing available resources.
13 See id. § 1089.
14 See id. § 1087.
15 See generally Armstrong, supra note 6.
16 See Scrivner, supra note 7.
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I. THE STATUTORY BASES AND PROCEDURES WITHIN THE CHILD
WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS
A. Permanency Legislation
New York's Permanency Legislation lies at the heart of some
radical changes within the state's family courts. The law aims to
alleviate the long-standing problem of foster children who
languish in the system. 7 In 1997, Congress officially recognized
this crisis through the Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA"). 18 By that time, approximately 500,000 children were in
foster care throughout the nation. 19 Even more troubling, these
children were spending an average of three years within the
system.20 These conditions led to the unfortunate situation that
many children "aged out" of foster care. In other words, foster
children remained in the system for such long periods of time,
particularly when they entered the system as adolescents or
teenagers, that they simply became too old to remain any longer.
In New York, for example, at the age of eighteen, an individual in
foster care may voluntarily remove herself from the system. 21 By
the age of twenty-one, these individuals are automatically
removed from the system.22 Therefore, the "ASFA relegislated
permanency planning-timely, well thought out decision-making
and good casework practice."23
One of the ASFA's major accomplishments was its
implementation of regular permanency hearings. Permanency
hearings are hearings "held ... for the purpose of reviewing the
foster care status of the child and the appropriateness of the
permanency plan."24  In general terms, social services and
appropriate organizations cooperate with the parties and the
courts in order to develop a plan best suited for the child and his
17 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1086.
18 See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application
by State Courts of the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act and Its Implementing
State Statutes, 10 A.L.R.6th 173 (2006).
11 Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First 3
Years of the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 25, 25 (2001).
20 Id.
21 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 398-a(1) (McKinney 2008).
22 Id.
? Gendell, supra note 19, at 26.
24 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(k) (McKinney 2008).
[Vol. 83:465468
FORGETTING SOMEONE?
needs.2" During the permanency hearings, the court hears the
facts of the child's case and determines both short-term and long-
term goals for the child.26 The court sets these objectives with
the ultimate purpose of stability in living arrangements for the
child in mind.27 Therefore, such eventual determinations by the
court may include reunification with a parent or freedom for
adoption.28
New York's legislation of 2005 builds upon the general
principles of the ASFA. Though the ASFA implemented
permanency hearings every twelve months upon initial
placement and every twelve months thereafter, 29 it soon became
obvious that foster children required regularity of a more
stringent type. One year in the life of a child away from his or
her home is a considerable amount of time and a great deal can
happen in the interim. Moreover, the vague descriptions of what
was to happen during these permanency hearings and how,
exactly, the courts should decipher a practical plan became
unworkable. Therefore, article 10-A of the New York Family
Court Act specifies the detailed happenings during the hearings
and the regularity with which they are to take place. °
One of the most important features of article 10-A is its
implementation of timelines. In order to prevent children from
aging out of the foster care system, the law sets very specific and
strict deadlines for the judicial procedures of foster children.
Although the dates vary somewhat depending on the manner in
which the child first entered care, the court must set a date for
the first permanency hearing no later than sixty days plus six
months from removal-essentially a total of eight months-from
the time the child first entered care.3 1  This date is a "date
certain," meaning that, in the absence of a strongly compelling
reason, the hearing must take place on the set calendar date.32
This prevents parties from rescheduling to try and find a date
convenient for everyone. Given that the court predetermines the
date eight months in advance, legal guardians, parents, custody
25 See id. § 1011.
26 See id. § 1089(c)(1).
27 See id. § 1086.
28 See id. § 1089(c)(1)(i)-(ii).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(i) (Supp. V 2005).
30 See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089.
31 Id. § 1089(a)(2).
32 Id.
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facilities, and any other parties will not be afforded much
leniency for requested delays.3  In addition, permanency
hearings must occur every six months thereafter for the
remaining period that the child continues in custodial care. 4
Article 10-A also designates a series of specific items that the
court must address during the permanency hearings. Of
particular importance is the law's provision requiring a sworn
report by the social services district submitted to the court and
the parties involved fourteen days before the permanency
hearing. 5 Prior to this implementation, the law dictated only
that a report be made, meaning that often the social services
district did not submit the report until trial, or even afterwards. 6
This was a major hindrance to the progress of the child, as the
court did not have any notice of the conditions of the youngster or
his living alternatives. The current permanency hearing report
details the health and well-being of the child and her status since
the last hearing.3 7 In contrast to the existing legislation, prior
law did not mandate inclusion of the child's health status, his
educational development, parental visitation, or even efforts
made by parents or relatives to achieve reunification.
The most important aspect of the new legislation is that
courts retain continued jurisdiction over the child's case.39 The
statute declares "the case shall remain on the court's calendar
and the court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case until the
child is discharged from placement and all orders regarding
supervision, protection or services have expired."4 ° Therefore, the
court orders after a permanency hearing do not end jurisdiction
and the child benefits from continued appearances. Each time
the child is due for another permanency hearing, she will be
before the same judge who has already heard her story and is
familiar with the case.
' See id. Previous laws allowed adjournments for various reasons, including the
absence of key parties. See also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 392 (repealed 2005).
34 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089(a)(3).
35 Id. § 1087(e).
36 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 392(5-a) (repealed 2005).
37 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1087(e).
- Judith M. Gerber & Sheryl Dicker, Children Adrift: Addressing the
Educational Needs of New York's Foster Children, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005).
39 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1088.
40 Id.
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B. Juvenile Delinquency Laws
Article 10-A fails to protect delinquent children adequately.
This Part explains the typical path likely to be faced by a New
York foster child accused of an act that would be a crime if
committed by an adult, thus revealing some of the inherent
loopholes within the law. Although New York statutes governing
delinquency adjudication are somewhat confusing and
dispersed,41 the experiences of "crossover" children 42-children
who move from foster care into the juvenile justice system-are
generally similar. 3
The initial stages of adjudication are fairly straightforward
and are often time-sensitive.44 First, a presentment agency files
a petition.4" The petition, although not subject to a strict time
limitation, must be filed within a reasonable period of time.46
Following the petition, the court will conduct an initial hearing.
When the child, or "respondent,"4" is detained, the initial
appearance must take place "no later than" seventy-two hours
after the filing of the petition or "the next day the court is in
session, whichever is sooner. "48 During the initial hearing, the
court will decide a number of issues, including whether the child
should be detained and the date of a probable cause hearing to
determine such detention.49
There are two initial observations worthy of attention at this
point. To begin, it is fairly likely that the foster child will remain
41 See Jean J. Davis et al., Bibliography of Selected Juvenile Justice Resources, 5
J.L. & POLY 385, 386 (1997).
42 See generally Claudette Brown, Crossing Over: From Child Welfare to
Juvenile Justice, 36 MD. B.J. 18 (2003).
1 It should be noted at the outset that under New York law, "juvenile
delinquent" means "a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age." See
FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1).
44 These time restrictions are a significant factor in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. Article 3 of the Family Court Act puts a great deal of time restraints
upon the initial stages of proceedings. This is, in part, due to the constitutional
protections and quasi-criminal nature of delinquency adjudications. See infra notes
76-79 and accompanying text. As the trial progresses, however, the importance of
the rapidity of proceedings fades. See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
45 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 310.1(2).
46 See In re Benjamin L., 92 N.Y.2d 660, 666-67, 708 N.E.2d 156, 159, 685
N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (1999).
47 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(2) ("'Respondent' means the person against whom
a juvenile delinquency petition is filed pursuant to section 310.1.").
48 Id. § 320.2.
49 Id. § 320.4(2)(a)-(c).
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in detention following her arrest. The reasons for this are
twofold. First, New York has founded its delinquency laws
around the assumption of parental guardianship." In the
absence of a parent, the child must wait until the court appoints
a law guardian. Though a zealous advocate for the interests of
the child, a law guardian can neither adequately fill the role of
parent nor appropriately and immediately provide living
arrangements in the same manner as a parent. Second, in
stating its reasons which support a detention order, the court
must declare "whether the continuation of the respondent in the
respondent's home would be contrary to the best interests of the
respondent based upon, and limited to, the facts and
circumstances available to the court at the time of the initial
appearance."5' The judge may easily answer such a question
where foster children are at issue. Simply put, they are foster
children for sound reasons, and the same reasons that justify
foster care initially will also justify detention in a delinquency
setting. Home, for whatever reason, is no longer a suitable living
arrangement for the child and, therefore, the court can also
legitimately justify detention. Likewise, the additional
requirements that the laws impose upon the courts are not
difficult to dispose of in cases of crossover children. For example,
the court must also determine "whether reasonable efforts were
made to make it possible for the respondent to safely return
home."52 One can assume, however, that the question will be
answered in the affirmative so long as the courts have adhered to
the impositions of the permanency legislation. In other words,
where courts must conduct regular and detailed permanency
hearings for foster children with the goal of permanency, it is
safe to assume that "reasonable efforts were made"53 and that the
courts have satisfied the statute.
In addition to likely detention, one should also note the
leniency of supposed time restrictions in juvenile proceedings.
Though upon initial appearance the court will declare the date of
a probable cause hearing, this is not a "date certain" as is the
case in permanency hearings. A "date certain" requires much
more than the usual commitment of a date set by the court and,
'o See Scrivner, supra note 7, at 139.
51 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(5)(a).
52 Id. § 320.5(5)(b).
53 Id.
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in general, the court will consider it to be legally binding. 4
Juvenile delinquents do not benefit from that level of certainty.
Such proceedings, therefore, are subject to change despite
general constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
The trial will continue with probable cause 5 and fact-finding
hearings.56 Courts generally conduct fact-finding hearings in a
relatively efficient and time-conscious manner. This, though,
reflects the inherent weaknesses of the system. In addition to
the inappropriate infiltrations of adult criminal justice
principles,57 juvenile delinquency courts are hearing only part of
the child's complete story. Oftentimes there is little doubt as to
whether the respondent committed the act in question and
whether the prosecutor can meet the burden of proof.58 The real
questions are why the child behaved as she did and what can be
done to correct it. Rehabilitation becomes a secondary goal in
delinquency proceedings, however. 9 Without thorough analysis
of the child's situation, it is easy to comply with speedy trial
mandates.
Where the prosecution has proven its case, the court will
hold a dispositional hearing and draw conclusions about
particular routes of placement. During the hearing, the court
will determine whether "the respondent requires supervision,
treatment, or confinement."60 Commonly, for reasons discussed
in Part II.A,6 lack of available alternatives requires that the
judge place the crossover child either with the commissioner of
social services or the Division of Youth in accordance with section
353.3 of the Family Court Act.62 Of these placements, most
generally occur through the Division of Youth,63 where the child's
options include a secure facility, limited-secure facility, or a non-
secure facility. 64 The types of facilities vary according to their
54 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 423 (8th ed. 2004).
55 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 325.1.
56 Id. § 340.1.
11 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
58 The burden of proof in this context is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." See
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 342.2(2); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970).
51 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
60 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.1(1).
61 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
62 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.3(1).
6 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.3 (McKinney
2008).
64 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.3(3).
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restrictive nature. For example, a "'[s]ecure detention facility'
means a facility characterized by physically restricting
construction, hardware and procedures" whereas a "'[non-secure
detention facility' means a facility characterized by the absence
of physically restricting construction, hardware, and
procedures. 65  Secure facilities, as suggested by the
nomenclature, are most like adult prisons, despite the general
aversion to such reference. They "provide the highest level of
security with enhanced staffing, perimeter fencing, exterior
lighting and increased security precautions."66 Similarly, limited
secure facilities also include "a perimeter fence, exterior lighting,
enhanced staffing and increased security precautions."67 In
contrast, non-secure facilities include mostly group homes, and
provide the most "family-like" environment.68
Placement in any of the three types of facilities contains the
significant possibility of extended stays. Any time that the court
has placed the respondent pursuant to section 353.3, the facility,
the Division of Youth, or the commissioner can petition the court
to extend such placement. 69 Therefore, initial placement may be
for a period of up to eighteen months. After this period has
elapsed, the court may extend placement in yearly increments
until the child's eighteenth birthday." The Family Courts may
even order an initial placement beyond the child's eighteenth
birthday as the "initial placement statute does not contain a
maximum age limitation."71
Where a child is in a secure or limited-secure facility,
extensions mean that the child will not benefit from judicial
oversight into her progress beyond the extension hearings. 2 The
children in foster homes and other non-secure facilities receive
65 Id. § 301.2(4)-(5).
r6 LARRY G. BROWN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES,
TESTIMONY TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMITTEES ON
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AND CODES 5 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter
TESTIMONY], available at www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/news/2006/20061218_Brown
Testimony.pdf.
67 Id.
' See Dep't of Juvenile Justice, http://www.nyc.gov/html/djj/html/nonsecure.
html (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
69 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 355.3(1).
70 Id. § 355.3(6).
"' In re Robert J., 2 N.Y.3d 339, 344, 811 N.E.2d 25, 27, 778 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765
(2004).
72 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 355.5.
474 [Vol. 83:465
FORGETTING SOMEONE?
permanency hearings, but only those under the general
guidelines of the original permanency legislation established by
the ASFA.73 This means that children will receive permanency
hearings on an annual basis only."4  Moreover, obligations
concerning the procedures and goals during those permanency
hearings are vague. The court shall decide on a "permanency
plan for the child that includes whether ... the child will be
returned to the parent, placed for adoption..., or referred for
legal guardianship, or ... placed in another planned permanent
living arrangement."75 What, exactly, this language means and
how the court should accomplish such lofty objectives is unclear
and the very basis of the new permanency legislation. Thus,
these children are left to suffer due to the confusion of the courts.
Despite the many problems of the delinquency system,
children are not without rights. In fact, courts often apply the
same constitutional rights to juveniles as they do to adults. For
example, federal laws dictate certain uniform principles
throughout the states. The Juvenile Justice Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 and its amendments are key pieces of
legislation in the United States. "The Act largely transferred,
from the federal government to the states, the obligation to
provide preventative and rehabilitative services for at-risk and
delinquent youth. The Act also required states to comply with
certain standards, such as separating incarcerated juveniles and
adults."76 There are many cases, as well, that have extended
constitutional rights to young Americans. 7   New York courts
have even recognized that placement of a child adjudicated
delinquent constitutes a deprivation of liberty78 and state laws
73 Ch. 7, § 30, 1999 N.Y. Laws 125 (McKinney); see also Janet R. Fink,
Implementing the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act in New York, a Primer on
the New Statute, in 183 LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS 157, 164-65 (Practising
Law Inst. ed., 1999).
74 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 355.5(2).
75 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (Supp. V 2005).
76 Davis, supra note 41, at 385 (footnote omitted).
77 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970) (establishing guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt); In re Anthony R., 119 Misc. 2d 557, 559, 462 N.Y.S.2d 1007,
1009 (Family Ct. Queens County 1983) (holding that parens patriae may not be used
to deprive juvenile delinquents of their constitutional rights); Davis, supra note 41
(discussing landmark cases in this area).
78 See In re Owens, 97 Misc. 2d 290, 292-93, 411 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (Family Ct.
Monroe County 1978).
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abound to extend protections beyond federal laws.
Unfortunately, implementation of these rights is necessary and
indicative of the divergent initiatives taken by New York family
courts as of late.79 As Part II divulges, the problems within the
Family Courts and, particularly, the juvenile justice system, are
numerous and significant.
II. How NEW YORK'S PERMANENCY LEGISLATION FAILS To
ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE AT THE COST OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS
New York's Permanency Bill-article 10-A--does not address
the needs of juvenile delinquents and therefore cannot effectuate
its goal of preventing children from languishing in the child
welfare system. The new statute explicitly excludes juvenile
delinquents from its coverage.80  This exclusion, in turn,
illustrates a significant defect in the law and a major problem in
the New York Family Court system generally. Juvenile
delinquents represent a considerable population of children in
the foster care system. Moreover, the circumstances that justify
placement in foster care may also lead to future delinquency
problems.
A. The Plight of Juvenile Delinquents
Elimination of juvenile delinquents from coverage under
article 10-A creates a multitude of problems, presenting
compelling reasons for legislative rectification. Though the
harms are numerous, three main categories sufficiently
encompass the result of exclusion. First, crossover children face
a significant possibility of placement in excessively prohibitive
facilities relative to the delinquent acts committed. Second, the
inadequate permanency legislation applied to juvenile
delinquents (as opposed to article 10-A applied to foster children)
leads to the possibility of lack of specificity within the
permanency hearings and long delays between hearings. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, crossover children do not benefit
from continuity, thus subjecting them to multiple hearings with
different parties and judges.
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
80 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1086 (McKinney 2008).
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1. Placement Within Secure Facilities
Courts are more likely to place foster children facing charges
of juvenile delinquency in secure facilities, affording them a
"punishment" disproportionate to the alleged act committed.
This is, in part, due to the fact that New York's juvenile
delinquency system assumes parental involvement in the
adjudication process.8 ' For the same reasons that a judge will
likely possess an inclination toward initial detention, there are
equally justifiable reasons for secure custody of a crossover child.
Essentially, the unique situation of a crossover child puts her at
a disadvantage under the current juvenile delinquency and
permanency laws.
The law, in fact, begins with return of the child to his home
as a foundational inquiry. 2 In the general case of an alleged
juvenile delinquent in a relatively functioning home, the court's
analysis is brief. If the child can safely return home, then the
logical course of action is to allow this, ensuring that state
resources will not be consumed and that the child continues his
usual mode of education. Placement in foster care, however,
means that home is already not an option. Thus, the crossover
child starts from an adverse position, given that the preferred
choice of placement is not available.
In addition, the limitations upon placement of crossover
children are even more extensive than just the simple exclusion
of residence with her family. During the dispositional hearings
of a crossover child, the court applies a standard of the "least
restrictive available alternative... which is consistent with the
needs and best interests of the respondent [child] and the need
for protection of the community," 3 in order to determine whether
confinement is appropriate. While home may not be an available
option, it initially appears that the law still aims to protect the
child. Generally, this type of statutory language would be
enough to protect the usual juvenile delinquent; yet, the
inadequacies of the juvenile delinquency laws with respect to
foster children create a situation wherein the crossover child is
left to suffer. Often times, less restrictive alternatives are not
available as a child's behavior serves to isolate her from the
81 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
82 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5.
"3 Id. § 352.2(2)(a). Different standards govern where the child is charged with a
designated felony. See id. § 353.3(5).
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already small number of possible foster homes and facilities.
Accusations of delinquency can take away what little hope a child
has left. Those foster homes or adoptive parents willing to give
the child a chance may become discouraged by seemingly
criminal proceedings pending against the child.8 4 Facilities and
persons untrained and not in a position to accommodate a
disobedient child are not likely to welcome a young person with a
pending delinquency case. Even those facilities that are
equipped may already be filled to maximum capacity. In essence,
an overcrowded child welfare system coupled with a deviant
adolescent logically leads to the conclusion that placement of a
child, even for the most conscientious of judges, will be difficult
and somewhat restrictive. Where there is nowhere else to turn,
the court may place children in secure or limited-secure facilities
in the hopes that they might be able to provide the children with
the services needed.8 5
At this point, at least brief reference should be made to the
fact that the weaknesses of the juvenile delinquency and
permanency legislation may actually lead the court to violate the
constitutional rights of crossover children. As previously stated,
federal and state law afford juvenile delinquents many of the
same constitutional protections as adults.8 6 Placing children in
secure facilities for reasons of practicality and lack of resources,
however, seems prima facie disproportionate punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. New York courts have
consistently held that Eighth Amendment protections do, in fact,
apply to juvenile offenders.88 Ultimately, whether placement of
crossover children within secure facilities violates the
Constitution depends upon a kind of balancing test where the
court "compare[s] 'the gravity of the offense,' understood to
84 Scrivner, supra note 7, at 139 ("If a child is in a foster placement and the
foster parents intend to adopt the child, a delinquency adjudication may deter them
from proceeding with the adoption.").
85 In fact, police may encourage delinquency proceedings in order to bring the
child to at least minimal resources. See Jeanne Asherman-Jusino, The Right of
Children in the Juvenile Justice System To Inclusion in the Federally Mandated
Child Welfare Services System, 3 D.C. L. REV. 311, 312 (1995).
" See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
87 This is particularly true as the courts and legislature continue a trend toward
increasing punishment. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
' See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re
Garrett, 74 Misc. 2d 961, 964, 346 N.Y.S.2d 651, 654 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County
1973).
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include not only the injury caused, but also the defendant's
culpability, with the 'harshness of the penalty.' "89 Although
there is no clear answer, the age, maturity, and underlying
causes for the delinquent act factor strongly on the side of
unconstitutionality. Not only does a child's physical and mental
condition suggest a relatively lower level of culpability than that
of an adult,9" crossover children may be particularly less culpable
as their unique circumstances and obvious familial dysfunction
have already resulted in foster care placement. Moreover,
Family Court judges seem to increasingly base their decisions
upon lack of options rather than on the harm caused by the child
or his fault. Secure facilities, though obviously not the
equivalent of adult penitentiaries, do restrict the freedom of
children contained within their walls.91 Such determinations,
though practical, do not appear constitutional.
Questions of constitutionality aside, whether the court places
the child within a secure, limited-secure, or non-secure facility,
the crossover child suffers from the absence of connectivity
between juvenile delinquency law and permanency legislation.
Children placed in secure facilities do not benefit from any kind
of permanency hearings whatsoever.92 The crossover child, thus,
goes from the world of foster care and article 10-A proceedings, to
a juvenile delinquency system seemingly indifferent to her
permanency and future. No permanency hearings in effect
means that neither judges, nor law guardians and placement
facilities will be under an obligation to analyze a child's progress,
the resources she receives, and what will happen to her after
detention. The result is the very evil that article 10-A seeks to
prevent: Children will languish in the system, without guidance,
without a place to live, and without the skills to live
independently. It is no surprise that recidivism abounds as the
child enters adulthood with crime as the only means of financial
and social support.9 3
89 Stanford, 537 U.S. at 969 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 394 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
0 See id. at 971.
91 See TESTIMONY, supra note 66, at 5-6.
92 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 355.5 (McKinney
2008).
9 See Rolf Loeber & Wim Slot, Serious and Violent Juvenile Delinquency: An
Update, 35 CRIME & JUST. 503, 563 (2007) (discussing the high recidivism rate
among juvenile delinquents).
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2. Vague Hearings and Lengthy Delays
Even those children that are lucky enough to find placement
in another foster home or non-secure facility will face the very
problems that the permanency legislation was meant to solve.
Among these are vague permanency hearings and extensive
delays. While article 10-A dictates that permanency hearings for
foster children take place on a "date certain," laws governing
juvenile delinquents do not require such strict dates. 4 Dates
certain ensure that delays and rescheduling conflicts are rare or
non-existent. In contrast, juvenile delinquents may remain in a
facility for months as the parties and judges struggle to find an
appropriate date. Although there are general speedy trial
requirements for juvenile delinquents,95 it can be quite a
daunting, and justifiably time-consuming, process to simply find
a date upon which all interested parties can attend the
proceedings.
New York legislation in this area simply does not
contemplate timeliness and permanency in a manner sufficient to
accommodate juvenile delinquents, and specifically, crossover
children. Detained delinquents must have an initial appearance
within seventy-two hours after the petition is filed or on the next
court day, whichever is sooner.9 Once the petition has been
filed, however, adjournments can and may occur.
Adjournments beyond the sixty day limitation merely require
that the moving party show good cause. This is understandably
not difficult to do when Family Courts and law guardians are
already quite burdened. When one considers the potential for
delay, it seems as though almost anything could frustrate the
case. Far from achieving permanency, juvenile delinquents
struggle simply to be heard. 9
" Compare N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089(a) (McKinney 2008) (requiring a court to
set a "date certain"), with id. § 340.1(4)(b) (allowing adjournments on as little as
"good cause").
" See In re Bernard T., 92 N.Y.2d 738, 745, 709 N.E.2d 79, 81, 686 N.Y.S.2d
338, 340 (1999).
9 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.2(1).
17 Id. § 340.1(4)(a)-(c).
98 Id. § 340.1(2), (4).
9 See In re Louis P., 304 A.D.2d 501, 501, 757 N.Y.S.2d 740, 740 (1st Dep't
2003) (holding that the presentment agency did not violate the Sixth Amendment
despite the fact that delays had continued for seven and a half months); In re Kelvin
R., 298 A.D.2d 183, 183, 748 N.Y.S.2d 46, 46 (1st Dep't 2002) (finding that the
respondent's rights were not violated despite a seven month delay).
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3. Lack of Continuity
Perhaps the most critical problem faced by these children is
lack of continuity. Proponents of the legislation of 2005 hail "the
principle that the Court retains continuous jurisdiction (and
involvement) from the day a child has been placed until the date
permanency is achieved through family reunification, adoption,
independent living, or a suitable permanency alternative" as "[a]
major achievement of article 10-A."1 ° When a court adjudicates
children as delinquent, not only are they left without regular
permanency hearings, but they also do not receive the resounded
benefits of continuity. Juvenile delinquents are placed at a
particular disadvantage0 1 because each time a judge adjudicates
his case or holds a permanency hearing (where applicable), the
judge is never able to actually come to know the entirety of
circumstances surrounding the child's behavior and arrest.1 2
Vague permanency hearings coupled with overburden dockets
allows the judge only to hear the very narrow events involving
the child's alleged delinquency. The problem worsens as the
child languishes in the system and a different judge presides over
each hearing. An individual judge never comes to know the
child's full story or how acts of delinquency may simply have
been manifestations of the failures of the child welfare system.
Particularly troubling is the fact that courts can extend
placement.10 3 Judges may be compelled to extend placement
where the minimum facts present a situation of a misbehaved
child with nowhere to go. 0 4 Thus, a judge may place a child for
an initial period of up to eighteen months, but extend that
placement in yearly increments up to the age of eighteen.0 5 In
essence, the child still "ages out" of the system, yet through a
100 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1086 (McKinney
2008).
101 Scrivner, supra note 7, at 135.
102 See In re Rudolph M., 174 Misc. 2d 273, 276-77, 664 N.Y.S.2d 399, 401
(Family Ct. Kings County 1997) (holding that the same judge need not preside over a
placement and an extension of placement hearing).
103 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.3(7); see also supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
,04 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 355.3(4) (requiring the court to consider the child's
possible living arrangements).
105 Id. § 353.3(5), § 355.3(6).
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means other than the foster care system. 06  Although the
legislators can claim that the permanency statute achieves its
goal of promoting permanency for children in of the foster care
system, the practical result is simply that more children age out
of the juvenile justice system. The successes of the law, despite
its well-intentioned objectives, are attributable merely to the
narrow way in which it defines "system." Where "system" means
only those children who are in foster care, then the law obtains
its goal; yet when we consider the child welfare system as a
whole, including juvenile delinquents, many children are still left
to languish.
B. Why Juvenile Delinquents Merit Inclusion in Article 10-A
The unique situation that crossover children present suggest
compelling reasons for their inclusion in the permanency
legislation of article 10-A beyond the problems mentioned above.
First, taken collectively, crossover children represent a large
subgroup of foster children. In fact, foster children are more
likely to become juvenile delinquents than the general population
within the same age group.'' Second, crossover children are
individuals, each of whom has a unique and heartbreaking story.
Although emotions may not present practical reasons for changes
under the law, it is important to recognize that each of these
children has the opportunity to either contribute to our society or
to impose burdens upon it. Moreover, crossover children, given
their circumstances, stand to gain the most from article 10-A
protection.
1. Juvenile Delinquents as Former Foster Children
The goal of the permanency legislation is "to establish
uniform procedures for permanency hearings for all children who
are placed in foster care .... It is meant to provide children
placed out of their homes timely and effective judicial review that
promotes permanency, safety and well-being in their lives."08
This objective, however, is merely an aspiration and its futility
'06 See Rudolph M., 174 Misc. 2d at 275-76, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 401 (holding that a
proceeding brought pursuant to the New York Family Court Act section 355.3 is not
brought by the Presentment Agency).
107 Wendy Koch, Study: Troubled Homes Better than Foster Care, USA TODAY,
July 7, 2007, at Al.
108 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1086.
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becomes obvious when one considers the large number of
children excluded from its protection. °9 It is a fallacy to say that
the statute achieves, or even aims to achieve, permanency for
"children placed out of their homes"110 when the reality is that
juvenile delinquents comprise a large number of children once in
the foster care system. Some experts estimate that as many as
half of the children adjudicated delinquent come from the child
welfare system."1 Still others find the numbers hard to ignore
1 2
and even conservative assessments calculate the number of
crossover children to be in the thousands."
3
These large numbers partially result from the fact that foster
children are more likely to become juvenile delinquents than
other children." 4  Countless studies reiterate the resounding
theme that there are "striking and significant overlaps in the
risk factors in both the child welfare and juvenile justice
systems."" 5  The very nature of circumstances which surround
placement in the foster care system dictate that the problem of
juvenile delinquency is, at the very least, a real possibility. From
a practical standpoint, despite the multitude of factors that could
lead any child along a path of delinquency, 6 it stands to reason
that underlying issues of familial abuse and neglect would have
profound effects upon a youngster that may cause one to act out
in ways that society generally considers unacceptable. The result
is that juvenile delinquents suffer from the inability of legislation
to effectively deal with such issues.
109 Persons in need of supervision (PINS) and article 6 custody placements are
also excluded from the legislation's coverage. Id. § 1087(a).
110 Id. § 1086.
I" See Armstrong, supra note 6.
112 See Scrivner, supra note 7 ("Countless children are involved in both the child
welfare/abuse and neglect system and the juvenile justice/delinquency system."); see
also Miriam Aroni Krinsky, A Case for Freedom of the Child Welfare System, 45
FAM. CT. REV. 541, 542 (2007).
113 Scrivner, supra note 7.
114 See Koch, supra note 107.
115 See Brown, supra note 42, at 22; see also In re Kingsley, 183 Misc. 727, 731,
49 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (recognizing that
most children become juvenile delinquents due to neglect or some kind of family
dysfunction); Armstrong, supra note 6; Scrivner, supra note 7.
116 See Margaret A. Zahn, The Causes of Girls' Delinquency and Their Program
Implications, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 456, 458 (2007).
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2. Their Individual Stories
The abstract numbers and statistics of the many crossover
children do not present the full picture of the ways in which
exclusion from article 10-A affects juvenile delinquents. Their
individual stories implicate expansive public policy reasons for
their inclusion. Take, for example, Sabrina S.117 In 1997, a New
York Family Court adjudicated Sabrina a delinquent and placed
her in Lansing Residential Center in Tompkins County. During
this placement, Sabrina "exhibit[ed] both verbal and passive
aggressive behavior."118 Her continued acts of disobedience and
destructive behavior led supervisors within the facility to become
increasingly frustrated with the young woman.'19 Sabrina was
lucky that the residential center did not request her expulsion
and, in fact, the court granted a one year extension of her
placement. 120 The court's decision was a single page analysis,
with only passing references to hopes for the child's future
progress and possible underlying reasons for her misbehavior.
Sabrina's stepfather and brother remained in the comforts of
their home, despite allegations of possible sexual abuse of the
young girl, while she was left in the system for twelve months
without consistent judicial oversight.121
Thus, the plight of juvenile delinquents described in Part
II.A, and the unique ways in which these problems may manifest
themselves in their individual lives present a clear failure of the
disconnect between the foster care and juvenile justice systems.
The background concerning a child's initial placement in foster
care and his progress, or lack thereof, within the system, can
have profound effects upon the child's future rehabilitative and
living needs. Without detailed permanency hearings following
delinquency adjudication, a judge may never come to know
underlying problems of sexual or physical abuse which resulted
in foster care placement in the first place. Knowledge of such
facts can help a judge presiding over delinquency proceedings to
decide where the child should live in the future and how to best
get that particular child the resources she needs. The absence of
such considerations means that the child may never find the
117 In re Sabrina S., 256 A.D.2d 914, 681 N.Y.S.2d 670 (3d Dep't 1998).
118 Id. at 915, 681 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
119 Id.
11' Id. at 915, 681 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
121 Id.
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necessary resources, and therefore, may continue to commit
delinquent-or even criminal-acts as she becomes an adult.
III. THE INABILITY OF THE COURT SYSTEM To ADJUDICATE
JUVENILE DELINQUENTS PROPERLY UNDER THE CURRENT
FORMULATION OF THE PERMANENCY LAWS
The weaknesses of article 10-A and the delinquency laws
generally are not the only source of quandary in the lives of
crossover children. The foster care system and the juvenile
justice system have taken widely divergent paths throughout
their histories significantly contributing to the punishment-
oriented delinquency regime (as opposed to a focus upon
rehabilitation) that has justified exclusion of juvenile delinquents
from permanency hearings. Differing objectives have, in turn,
led to a general lack of cooperation and coordination between the
two systems. Ultimately, one of the biggest problems has been a
lack of resources available to both courts.
The most notable reason why the legislature viewed juvenile
delinquents differently from foster children, and therefore,
excluded them from article 10-A, is the divergent paths that the
two systems have taken throughout the course of their histories.
Although the goals of the foster care system and the juvenile
delinquency system derive from the same general premise-
protecting children-each has carved out its own, specialized
jurisdiction.
The juvenile justice system originated with the goals of
rehabilitation and treatment as its main objectives.122 For years,
New York courts have emphasized their focus upon child
protection rather than punishment. 123 Recently, however, this
goal has changed and become increasingly punishment oriented.
This is evidenced by the very roots of the juvenile justice system.
122 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney
2008).
123 See In re Robert J., 2 N.Y.3d 339, 346, 811 N.E.2d 25, 29, 778 N.Y.S.2d 763,
767 (2004); see also People v. Nancy C., 188 Misc. 2d 383, 388, 727 N.Y.S.2d 867, 871
(Watertown City Ct. 2001); see also In re Williams, 120 Misc. 2d 257, 267, 465
N.Y.S.2d 949, 955 (Fam. Ct. Onondaga County 1983).
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Early legislators actually carved juvenile delinquency laws from
the adult criminal justice system.124 Moreover,
[t]he development of the court.., was born out of the needs of
the times. It was looked upon as a solution to the increasing
numbers of... delinquent youths. If the conditions that helped
to produce so many delinquent youths.. . had not occurred, the
juvenile court might never have been necessary.125
In other words, the entire system originated with the idea that
these children were somehow different from the rest of society.
They were troubled and wayward, problems in need of
rectification rather than children in need of help.
As the juvenile courts continued throughout history to their
modern states, the dual nature of protection and punishment
became increasingly at odds. "Not only is the court expected to
carry out its original purpose as a welfare agency for the
rehabilitation of wayward youths, it is also expected to protect
society from the foul deeds of the juvenile delinquent." 126  This
has been reflected in the upsurge of constitutional protections
now afforded delinquents. As the system has become more
punishment oriented, courts have been forced to provide these
youngsters with the same rights as adult criminals 127 and more
and more courts have come to recognize that delinquency
proceedings are, at least, "quasi-criminal in nature. 128 In 1976,
punishment objectives officially became a part of New York
juvenile delinquency law.129  Courts now must balance
rehabilitation desires with "the need for protection of the
community."' 30 As courts struggle to keep our communities safe,
protection of the children themselves becomes a difficult aim to
124 See CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 228 (Christine
Cardone ed., Macmillan Publ'g Co. 3d ed. 1991) (1979).
125 Id. at 229-30.
126 Id. at 230-31.
127 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
557 (1966); see also Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68,
73 (1997); Craig Hemmens et al., The Rhetoric of Juvenile Justice Reform, 18
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 661, 661 (1999).
12 See In re Kenneth C., 114 Misc. 2d 676, 677, 452 N.Y.S.2d 176, 178 (Fam. Ct.
Richmond County 1982); In re Erick K., 100 Misc. 2d 796, 799, 420 N.Y.S.2d 135,
138 (Fam. Ct. Richmond County 1979); In re George C., 91 Misc. 2d 875, 877, 398
N.Y.S.2d 936, 939 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
129 See Teresa A. Hughes, Placement of Juveniles Beyond Their Communities as
a Detriment to Inner-City Youths, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 153, 161 (2001).
130 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2008).
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achieve. Therefore, while the foster care system continues to
retain paternalistic principles over children, the juvenile justice
system does not.
These divergent foundations result in discrepancies in
permanency laws and a lack of cooperation of the child welfare
system as a whole. Increased specification has resulted in
inefficient distinctions among the family court system generally
and among the New York lower courts. For example, New York
categorizes its cases into subjects such as divorce, custody, foster
care, and delinquency, each with its own specialized courts
and judges. Familial issues, however, are predominantly
interconnected.
The current system fosters inefficiency in two main ways:
First, courts do not have the flexibility to share work in order to
transfer cases from burdened dockets to more available ones, and
second, one judge is often jurisdictionally incapable of hearing
claims stemming from the same factual scenario. 31
Illogical distinctions within the Family Court system mean
that cases stemming from the same underlying facts bounce from
court to court. The result is sometimes overinclusive, creating
overlaps between cases and courts. On the other hand,
important cases and facts may fall to the wayside as the
overburdened system struggles to address the multitude of
proceedings that a single family could potentially present. As
Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye noted, however, this "blizzard of
overlapping courts .... imposes significant harm and costs on
our state and its people ... , includ[ing] ... [flamilies in crisis."132
As the case changes jurisdictions, the judge presiding over
the case changes as well. Oftentimes, parties working on cases
involving the same child and/or family may not realize that there
are concurrent proceedings within another court and before
another judge. 133 Even judges may not understand the entirety of
a child's case.1 34 A judge's attempts to educate himself on the
complete matters will likely mean numerous, and sometimes
traumatic, court appearances as the child must continually
'3' JUDITH S. KAYE, A COURT SYSTEM FOR THE FUTURE: THE PROMISE OF COURT
RESTRUCTURING IN NEW YORK STATE 46 (2007) [hereinafter THE REPORT], available
at http://nycourts.gov/reports/courtsys-4future-2007.pdf.
132 Id. at 7.
133 See Scrivner, supra note 7, at 140.
134 See THE REPORT, supra note 131, at 36-37.
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recount her story."15  Moreover, the trend toward juvenile
punishment further exacerbates the existing problem as more
and more cases previously within the Family Court jurisdiction
move toward the adult court system. 136  Once again, the case
moves to another jurisdiction within another court with a judge
who knows very little about the surrounding circumstances.
The connection between such inefficient overlaps and a
general lack of cooperation among the systems makes the
scarcity of resources obvious. Multiple cases with the same
underlying facts, appearing again and again as children enter
child welfare, significantly strains court time, increases the
workload of law guardians, and burdens dockets. Further
compounding the problem of a lack of resources is the fact that
article VI of the New York Constitution places a limit upon the
number of lower court judges, based upon population. 137 In turn,
this provision forced the Chief Administrative Judge to reallocate
resources, albeit in a somewhat artificial and sometimes
injurious manner. In order to fill deficits, the Judge transferred
judges from their benches, to other courts.1 38  In effect, the
numbers of Family Court judges dwindled further as they were
asked to fill even larger deficits in other parts of the New York
lower court system. With few judges, and even less time, the
Family Courts place the burden upon the crossover child to suffer
the consequences.
IV. SOLUTIONS
New York's permanency legislation of 2005 presents a
profound and complex predicament. Despite the comprehensive
problem posed by crossover children, there are equally extensive
solutions that can substantially improve this unique dilemma.
The most obvious solution includes expansion of the permanency
legislation to include all children placed outside of the home,
including juvenile delinquents. This would, at the very least,
allow foster children who commit delinquent acts the benefits of
continued permanency hearings. Expansion, however, provides
but a temporary solution to an enduring issue. In order to fully
' See Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court:
Balancing Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L.Q. 381, 388 (2003).
136 See id.; see also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
137 THE REPORT, supra note 131, at 23.
138 Id.
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resolve the exclusion of juvenile delinquents from the
permanency legislation and to optimize the effectiveness of the
statute, New York's courts require restructuring. Unification of
the lower courts would enable the dissolution of inefficient
jurisdictional distinctions and the pooling of resources.
The most immediate manner in which to rectify the failures
of New York's permanency legislation is to amend the statute in
order to include juvenile delinquents (and PINS) within its
coverage. This simple adjustment would ensure that juvenile
delinquents placed out of their homes have access to the same
resources that they would otherwise have. They, like other foster
children, would receive regular permanency hearings with
continued jurisdiction. The courts would no longer be able to
ignore crossover children; rather, they would have the ability to
devote the time and consideration necessary to adjudicate such a
case. An amendment to the permanency legislation would equip
Family Court judges with the knowledge, through prior hearings,
to make informed and appropriate decisions concerning
delinquency adjudication and placement.
Inclusion of juvenile delinquents within the law, however,
does not fully solve the problem. In fact, it merely contributes to
an already burdened system, revealing the inadequacies of New
York court system generally. The fact that adding juvenile
delinquents to the new legislation could potentially burden the
courts to the point of malfunction exposes the fragility our
current court structure. The family courts, and in fact the entire
judiciary organization, have become antiquated and
unmanageable. The ever-changing face of the American family
and the increased overlap of family court cases 139 dictate change
in the form of a court merger, or at least an integrated Family
Court.
Merging New York's trial courts, including Family Court,
into a single Supreme Court would effectuate a number of
positive changes within the New York court system and ensure
that the judiciary apply article 10-A-and in fact many other
state laws, particularly those pertaining to crossover children-
in an optimal manner. Through consolidation of lower state
courts into one, or a minimal number, of courts, the divergent
139 See Bobbe J. Bridge, Solving the Family Court Puzzle: Integrating Research,
Policy, and Practice, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 190, 194 (2006).
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goals of the foster care system and the juvenile justice system
could again reunite. The judiciary would be better able to pool
resources, there would be greater efficiency and thus fewer
delays in proceedings, and crossover children could finally benefit
from continuity.
Chief Judge Kaye, along with a multitude of other experts
and professionals, advocates a plan that "calls for consolidation of
the State's major trial courts into a simple two-tier structure: a
Supreme Court and a District Court."14 Under such a scheme,
there would be no formal distinction among lower state courts.
In other words, the "newly expanded Supreme Court would have
general jurisdiction to hear any kind of case, including all family
cases and cases that include claims against the state. '4 The
benefits are almost immediately apparent. Consolidation would
provide for fluidity and flexibility in the system, allowing the
court to hear cases such as those involving domestic violence or
crossover children in a more comprehensive manner. In the
absence of jurisdictionally distinct courts,1 42 judges would not be
under an obligation to stay, reserve, or remove cases based solely
upon the multiplicity of issues.
In its simplest form, merger would mean that crossover
children would not suffer from numerous cases, before different
judges, in different courts. If judges were afforded greater
jurisdictional leeway and the ability to hear cases with some
sense of fluidity, this would at least open the possibility for
continuity of proceedings for crossover children. Without
jurisdictional barriers, a single judge would have the potential to
hear a child's case, not only from start to finish of foster care
proceedings, but also as the child's case moves into the juvenile
justice arena. Thus, article 10-A and the protections of regular
permanency hearings would apply to the crossover child.
Obligatory cessation of frequent, detailed permanency hearings
would no longer be the norm, as the mere topic of proceedings
changed.
In addition to continuity, general integration would help to
reunite the divergent goals of the foster care and juvenile justice
140 JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 4 (2007) [hereinafter THE
STATE OF THE JUDICIARY], available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/admin/
stateofjudiciary/soj2007.pdf. See generally THE REPORT, supra note 132.
141 THE REPORT, supra note 131, at 68.
142 See id. at 10.
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systems. 43 Historically, the systems began with the same goal of
protection for children at their foundations, and fragmentation
within the family court structure has "evolved through historical
accident. '144 The result has been a New York court system that
"is the most archaic and bizarrely convoluted court structure in
the nation."'45  Defragmentation would aid the courts in
reevaluating the current trend toward juvenile punishment and
potentially reverse it, eventually bringing juvenile justice into
conformity with its original premise. In fact, "the Pre-Gault
[juvenile] court was a kind of unified family court."'46
Assimilation of the foster care and juvenile justice regimes would
quell the somewhat adversarial and competitive juxtaposition
presently in existence. Family Court judges would instead have
the freedom to work under a system of unified goals and rules.'4 7
Similarity, or likely a fusion, in goals would allow not only
the foster care courts and juvenile justice courts to work in a
more efficient manner, but would also mean efficiency for the
system as a whole. For example, a number of states throughout
the country have already realized the benefits that court merger
makes possible. 4 ' New Jersey and California, in particular, have
responded to the very same problems currently facing the New
York courts through judicial merger. Prior to change, experts
criticized New Jersey courts for their "overlapping jurisdictions,
the... inordinate delays in the administration of justice,
and... the attendant inefficiency in operations."'49  Similarly,
reforms in California focused upon "matters of efficiency and
'management' in holding trials and, more generally, in processing
disputes."'10
143 See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
144 Judith D. Moran, Fragmented Courts and Child Protection Cases: A Modest
Proposal for Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 488, 488 (2002); see also THE STATE OF THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 140, at 14 (discussing the Family Court's current dependence
on criminal probation departments).
145 THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 140, at 3.
14 Danziger, supra note 135, at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 New Jersey's family court integration has actually had the effect of rule
unification in order to promote its consistent application for children and families.
See THE REPORT, supra note 131, at 29.
148 See id. at 28 (citing THOMAS A. HENDERSON, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDICIAL
STRUCTURE: THE EFFECT OF UNIFICATION ON TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS 3 (1984)).
149 Joseph Harrison, New Jersey's New Court System, 2 RUTGERS L. REV. 60, 73
(1948).
150 Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of Judicial
Reform and the California Courts, 1960-1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2049, 2050 (1993).
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Court merger in both states led to the desired aims of
proficiency. In 1947, New Jersey consolidated its system from
seventeen different courts, 151 each with unique jurisdictional
boundaries, to seven courts.152 Significantly, trial judges within
New Jersey were able to hear all cases in all trial courts. 5 3 As a
result, the state almost immediately realized a fifty percent
improvement in the efficiency of proceedings.5 Several years
later, noting the continued success of New Jersey, California
voters followed suit, voting in 1950 to amend the state
constitution to allow for a simplified two-tier structure. 55 After
several years and changing legislative votes, the California
system now consists of one trial level court of general
jurisdiction, along with an appellate court and a high court. 15 6 A
recent study revealed such benefits as "improved service to the
public... ; a reduction in backlog and improved case disposition
time... ; judges hearing a wider range of cases... ; and
standardization of local rules. 157
The success of other states and the problems revealed by
New York's current state of affairs suggest that New York should
abolish the illogical distinctions within its Family Court.
Proceedings, where appropriately under the jurisdiction of
Family Court, should not undergo further categorization into
matters such as divorce, custody, foster care, and delinquency.
The life of a crossover child may include multiple court
appearances. The same instances of child abuse or neglect may
underlie permanency hearings and foster care placement,
criminal charges against the parents, and acts of delinquency. In
each of these instances, the child suffers as the case bounces
between jurisdictions and judges.
... New York currently has eleven different trial courts alone. THE REPORT,
supra note 131, at 16.
152 THE REPORT, supra note 131, at 28-29 (citing CARLA VIVIAN BELLO &
ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, NEW JERSEY'S JUDICIAL REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL
MIRACLE, 19-20 (1997)).
' See id. at 29.
' See Richard Hartshorne, Progress in New Jersey Judicial Administration, 3
RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 178 (1949).
155 See THE REPORT, supra note 131, at 30 (citing Los Angeles Superior Court,
About the Court: Historical Perspective, http:/www.lasuperiorcourt.org/aboutcourt/
history.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008)).
156 See id. at 31.
151 Id. at 32 (citing MARY ANNE LAHEY ET AL., ANALYSIS OF TRIAL COURT
UNIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT 1 (2000)).
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CONCLUSION
New York's permanency legislation of 2005 has done a great
deal to help foster children and prevent them from languishing in
the system for extensive periods of time. Detailed permanency
hearings and continued jurisdiction certainly appear steps in the
right direction. These are, however, only steps, and juvenile
delinquents require particular inclusion. In the absence of their
incorporation in the new law, juvenile delinquents, who comprise
a significant number of children previously or simultaneously in
the foster care system, will not benefit from the advantages of the
new legislation. Foster children who commit acts of juvenile
delinquency will continue to pine in placements outside of their
homes without the coverage of article 10-A.
To best facilitate the inclusion of juvenile delinquents and
overall judicial efficiency, New York should merge its lower
courts. This would eliminate jurisdictional barriers, allowing
flexibility for cases involving multiple issues and greater
resources for the courts overall. Most of all, crossover children
would be able tell their complete stories, potentially before one
judge, and work with the courts to develop a permanency plan
that would facilitate stability.
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